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On 14 November 1938, workers in the Standard Jute Mill in Titaghur 
(24-Parganas, Bengal) went on strike after the dismissal of six spin-
ners. The strike was led by 'madrassi' workers, who were employed in 
the preparing and spinning departments. They demanded the re-insta-
tement of the dismissed workers, and an increase in wages.1 Within a 
matter of days, 'madrassi' workers in five other jute mills in Titagarh 
went on strike in support of the workers in the Standard Jute Mill, fol-
lowed by protests in Jagatdal, Naihaty and Hooghly. The Bengal 
Chatkal Mazdoor Union (BCMU), meanwhile, declared its support for 
the movement, and called for a general strike.2 
By December, this scenario seemed increasingly likely. More than 
50,000 workers were on strike in the industrial hinterland of Calcutta 
at this point.3 By the second half of the month, however, the labour 
conflict came to be overshadowed by communal riots that escalated in 
Titagarh between 'madrassi' and 'up-country' workers. Whereas the 
former were Hindus, the latter were in their majority Muslims. Commu-
nal tensions were reported from other areas as well, and the BCMU 
soon withdrew its support for a general strike. Instead, the union tried 
to stop the spread of the strike movement in order to prevent further 
riots. The strikes ended soon in most areas, but in Titagarh, workers 
stayed out until early January, when they were forced to resume work 
unconditionally.4 
In the weeks after the strikes’ end, the event remained a prominent 
theme in various reports. The managers of the Titaghur Jute Mills deci-
ded to implement punitive measures and dismissed all 'madrassi' wor-
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kers from their mills. The managers of the Kelvin and the Empire Jute 
Mills pursued a similar course and dismissed large numbers of 
'madrassi' workers in their mills as well. This amounted to the sudden 
dismissal of 2,500 workers and to the eviction of 8,000 people from 
the mills’ coolie lines.5 A representative of the Titaghur Jute Mills jus-
tified this decision by explaining that 'madrassi' workers "have them-
selves to blame, as they have given a lot of trouble in the past years, 
and even during the present unrest they have been given a great deal 
more consideration than they deserve."6 
While the eviction of 'madrassis' in Titagarh was going on, about 
500 'madrassi' workers marched to Calcutta and addressed politicians 
and labour activists in order to force the mill authorities to reverse the 
decision. When they received no help, they eventually occupied the 
office of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee7, and "besieged" 
the residence of Subhas Chandra Bose, demanding that "employment 
should be found for them."8 By early February, however, the 'madrassi' 
jute workers of Titagarh had to give up their struggle, and their traces 
faded in the industrial hinterland of Calcutta. 
The strikes in Titagarh were in many respects symptomatic of the 
situation in the jute belt of Bengal in the late 1930s. In 1936, an 
increasing number of strikes was reported which was followed by a 
general strike in 1937. In the next two years the situation in the jute 
industry was marked by a near-continuous series of local strikes in 
various mill districts—a trend which only seemed to come to an end 
with the onset of World War II.9 
Spinners regularly played a leading role in these conflicts. The mills 
in Titagarh are, indeed, a good example of this trend, since virtually all 
strikes in the 1930s were started by spinners, as we shall see in more 
detail below. The particular patterns of employment in the jute indus-
try, however, meant that strikes by spinners did not necessarily coin-
cide with strikes by 'madrassi' workers. In the southern part of the jute 
belt, the majority of workers in spinning departments were categorised 
as 'locals'—or Bengali workers. In the northern parts of the jute belt 
spinning departments were dominated by 'madrassi' workers—who had 
originally migrated from today’s Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (Cox 
2013: 45). The increasing visibility of 'madrassi' workers in this period, 
in other words, signified an increased importance of spinners during 
labour conflicts. 
In historiographical studies on the jute industry, this peculiar trend 
has been ignored. Instead, historians read the history of the jute 
 FORUM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
267 
industry through the figure of the 'up-country' migrant worker. The 
presence of other groups is acknowledged when the composition and 
emergence of the workforce is discussed. In other words, this problem 
is always relegated to the 'background' of historians’ narratives. How-
ever, it habitually disappears when analyses turn to the dynamics of 
change in the industry. Arjan de Haan, for instance, argues that "[o]ne 
of the central characteristics of the Bengal labour historiography is that 
it deals only with non-Bengali labour" (de Haan 2001: 123). He then 
goes on to equate 'non-Bengali' labour with 'up-country' workers 
(ibid.).  
The result is that the prominent position of Bengali workers in 
labour conflicts has been taken note of. This seemed to be the result of 
an increased presence of trade unionists among Bengali workers. Their 
role in strikes, however, seemed to be dwarfed by the importance of 
'up-country' weavers, who, accordingly, came to be seen as the driving 
force in labour conflicts (Chakrabarty 1989; Das Gupta 1994; Basu 
2004; Ghosh 2000). The other aspect of this development—the increa-
sing importance of 'madrassi' workers—has been missed out. These 
workers remained entirely invisible in historians’ accounts of labour 
conflicts. Subho Basu’s reading of the strike in Titagarh in November 
1938 is symptomatic of this omission. Basu elides the victimisation of 
workers after the resumption of work, and ignores the previous history 
of labour conflicts in Titagarh. He examines the conflict solely in order 
to establish the escalation of communal tensions in the jute belt. He 
consequently ends up reading the strike in 1938 solely as a communal 
riot (Basu 2004: 259).  
Closely related to this problem is that the protests of 'spinners' in 
this period are rendered marginal. The historical narratives that esta-
blish the initial employment of workers along ethnic lines as a mere 
background, also set out a more or less static field of force within 
which workers operated. Once the segmentation of workforces is esta-
blished, the specificities of different departments does no further work 
in the analysis. Any account of how the organisation of individual 
departments—such as spinning—changed over time, and how these 
changes may have altered the bases for industrial action, is, in turn, 
omitted. Historical accounts miss out the importance of different 
groups of workers protesting simultaneously 'as spinners.' At this 
point, historians have turned to the role of Bengali trade unionists in 
order to account for the role of Bengali workers. 'Madrassi' workers, 
meanwhile, remain invisible. 
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In the following paper I would like to address this problem, by tra-
cing the history of 'madrassi' spinners, considering them 'simultane-
ously' as 'madrassi' workers and as spinners. The focus of this analysis 
will be on Titagarh. One obvious reason for this choice is that Titagarh 
played an important role in labour conflicts in this period. Another, no 
less important, reason, however, is that the majority of mills in Tita-
garh were run by managing agencies which left behind unusually copi-
ous documentation. Detailed reports have been preserved, in parti-
cular, for the Titaghur Jute Mills, which belonged to the Dundee-based 
Duff Company. These offer us important insights into changing work-
place relations on the one hand and into patterns of unrest on the 
other hand. 
1 
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, Titagarh was merely a 
small village on the banks of the Hooghly, about 20 kilometres to the 
north of Calcutta. The first jute mills had opened their gates in the 
1850s in Serampore and Baranagore to the south of Titagarh, leaving 
the village unaffected by the early growth of the industry (de Haan 
1994: 21). In the 1870s, the industry experienced its first significant 
boom, and new jute mills opened their gates at various spots in the 
hinterland of Calcutta (Wallace 1928: 53). This growth slowed in the 
following decade. The few new mills included the Titaghur Jute Mill, 
which opened its gates in 1884 (Leng 1896: 76).  
In the mid-1890s, the industry entered a new phase of industrial 
growth, even surpassing the earlier boom. This development produced 
two important changes. Firstly, the expansion of the industry led to a 
higher density of jute mills in the hinterland of Calcutta. Villages like 
Titagarh turned rapidly into industrial towns, and into major labour 
centres. By 1913, five new mills had been built in the area. One of 
them, the Titaghur Jute Mill No. 2, was erected in the same compound 
as the town’s first mill. The older mill was henceforth called Titaghur 
Jute Mill No. 1. These mills were among the largest on the river, 
employing more than 10,000 workers daily by the 1920s (Sailer 2015: 
47). Additionally, the new town enjoyed a central position in the emer-
ging jute belt. While mill towns sprang up all along the river, the nor-
thern parts of Calcutta developed into a particularly densely populated 
area, which contained by far the highest concentration of jute mills. In 
Barrackpore and Jagatdal to the north, 13 mills opened their gates in 
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the aftermath of the second industrial boom. To the south of Titagarh, 
jute towns emerged in Khardah and Kamarhatty (Wallace 1928: 96-7).  
The second change concerned the sources of labour supply. Until the 
mid-1890s, mill managers relied nearly exclusively on local supplies of 
labour. Jute mills were, accordingly, populated by 'Bengali' workers 
from surrounding villages, who walked several miles each day to reach 
their workplace (Rungta 1985: 116). The expansion of the industry, 
however, meant that a locally limited supply of labour was not suf-
ficient any more. In an attempt to solve this problem, managers in-
creasingly hired migrant workers, thus widening the sources of labour 
supply (Das Gupta 1994: 209ff.). 'Up-country' workers were the first, 
and most prominent, group of migrant workers in the jute mills. These 
workers had originally migrated from Bihar and the United Provinces. 
They were usually men who left their wives and families behind in their 
rural homes. These "unsettled settlers", as Arjan de Haan called them, 
returned to their homes regularly. They relied on their rural base and 
the labour of their family back home. This was an important survival 
strategy for workers faced with low and irregular wages, as well as 
with poor living conditions in the mill towns (de Haan 1994: 15).  
In the first decade of the twentieth century, a new group of migrant 
workers came to work in the jute belt: Telugu and Tamil speakers from 
the province of Madras, who were categorised as 'madrassi' (ibid.: 25). 
In contrast to 'up-country' migrant workers, they usually came to Ben-
gal with their families, and returned home less often (ibid.: 15). 
Instead, their survival rested on the family income that was earned in 
Bengal. The parallel growth of other industries in the area—such as 
paper mills, cotton mills, and railway workshops—certainly contributed 
to the options of 'madrassi' workers (Basu 1993: 23) providing a se-
cure source of employment for men, women and children in the hinter-
land of Calcutta. Odd jobs in local bazars were another source of in-
come, in particular for children who were too young to work in the mill. 
For this purpose, 'madrassi' workers hired teachers, who taught their 
children rudimentary Bengali.10 
The growing importance of migrant workers was a general trend in 
this period. Yet, in terms of the distribution of different groups of wor-
kers in the jute industry, this development was strikingly uneven. 'Up-
country’ workers took a prominent position in beaming and weaving 
departments throughout the Bengal jute belt. 'Madrassi' workers, in 
contrast, came to replace 'Bengali' workers in the preparing and spin-
ning departments in the northern parts of the jute belt. In the south, 
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local workers continued to dominate the spinning departments (Cox 
2013: 45). This specific pattern of workforce changes reflected very 
precise managerial strategies. It linked different requirements of the 
process of production with the uneven distribution of jute mills in the 
hinterland of Calcutta. 
The beaming and weaving departments combined two features 
which, from the perspective of managers and managing agents, favou-
red a widening of labour supply. The size of these departments, first, 
generated a high demand for labour. This was particularly the case in 
the weaving department. Ranajit Das Gupta has estimated that about 
25 per cent of the workforce was employed here, rendering this by far 
the largest department of the mill (Das Gupta 1994: 340).  
The process of production in these departments, meanwhile, requi-
red a comparatively high degree of skill. Competition for skilled wea-
vers and beamers, thus, was a prime managerial concern from the 
earliest days of the industry (Rungta 1985: 118). The expansion of the 
industry after the mid-1890s increased these anxieties, as the indus-
try’s growth rested largely on the production of finer jute cloths (Cox 
2013: 14-5). Managerial concerns about attracting skilled workers, 
however, were also reflected in the wage hierarchies in jute mills. 
Weavers earned by far the highest wages, followed by beamers.11 A 
limited supply of workers at the moment of expansion, in this context, 
seemed to, inevitably, increase the 'risk' of further wage hikes (Bates 
2000: 19).  
In the preparing and spinning departments the situation was some-
what different. Here, the overall number of workers employed was 
much lower. Virtually all tasks were categorized as unskilled. The lower 
priority accorded to securing skilled workers was reflected in the low 
wages paid.12 Further, the preparing and spinning departments 
employed the highest proportion of women and children. These sec-
tions of the workforce were nearly exclusively employed here, and 
their tasks were categorised as particularly simple (Sen 1999: 100-1). 
It was, instead, the stability of production which came to be at the 
heart of managerial concerns. Bengal jute mills combined the pro-
duction of jute yarn and woven jute cloths in one industrial unit. This 
arrangement implied that a constant supply of yarn to the ever hungry 
weaving looms was a principal condition for the production of jute 
cloths. This problem was further accentuated by the uneven quality of 
raw jute, as well as by the resultant difficulties in producing a regular 
amount of yarn (Sailer 2015: 37). The combination of the processes of 
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spinning yarn and weaving cloths in one industrial unit, in other words, 
marked a delicate moment in the process of production.   
The patterns of employment of Bengali and 'madrassi' workers de-
monstrate this preoccupation with the stability of production—or, more 
precisely−with the stability of the workforce. Bengali workers conti-
nued to dominate the spinning departments in the immediate after-
math of the boom of the mid-1890s. The rapid growth of jute towns in 
the northern parts of the jute belt, however, made it more and more 
difficult to rely on local sources of labour. Around the turn of the 
century, 'madrassi' workers came to replace them (Chaudhury 1921: 
1983). In order to further bind these workers to jute mills, managers 
provided for additional houses in 'coolie lines' in mill compounds. Rents 
in these houses were considerably lower than those charged for other 
sections. This was the case with rents paid both inside and outside the 
mill compound.13 This situation only changed during the Great Depres-
sion, when managers altered this structure by increasing the rents of 
'madrassi' workers disproportionately.14 
2 
In the 1920s, the situation in the jute industry began to change signi-
ficantly. After decades of impressive expansion, the mills on the Hoo-
ghly were increasingly faced with the problem of overproduction. The 
productive capacity far exceeded the global demand for jute goods. In 
order to sustain profit levels, the members of the Indian Jute Mills’ 
Association (IJMA), implemented a series of short-time agreements, 
which lasted nearly continuously throughout the decade. The success 
enjoyed by these agreements meant that high profits could still be 
made from jute mills. Indian capitalists, thus, seized the chance to 
open new mills in Bengal, followed by other attempts to establish jute 
industries in different countries (Gupta 2005: 538).  
Retrospectively, this was the beginning of a crisis that would haunt 
the industry and shape its future. In the 1920s contemporaries still 
hoped to divert the crisis. With the onset of the Great Depression in 
1929, however, this option was not really feasible any more. Between 
1930 and 1931, the mills on the Hooghly implemented massive wage 
cuts, reduced hours of work, and dismissed about 60,000 workers. In 
1931, the manager of Titaghur Jute Mill No. 1 reported to his directors 
in Dundee that in the town of Titagarh "about 9,000-10,000" workers 
had been dismissed in one go. In his own mill alone, 1,471 workers 
had been "paid off."15 With some satisfaction, he reported an improved 
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labour supply situation, stating that "a better class of worker is avai-
lable. A higher standard of work can be got from the operatives as 
they realise that there is a plentiful supply of labour in the Bazaar to 
replace them should their work prove unsatisfactory."16 
The manager of the Titaghur Jute Mill No. 2 added in his report that 
every "effort has been made during the year to economise in all pos-
sible ways, and the number of workers has been reduced to the mini-
mum consistent with the efficient working."17 Attempts to further ratio-
nalise the process of production would be an important theme in the 
years to come. Until the mid-1930s, the managers of both mills con-
tinued to reassure their directors that they had reduced the labour 
force further, and saved labour costs.18 
Needless to say, these developments came to have an impact on 
'madrassi' workers. In principle, this was of course true for other sec-
tions of the workforce as well. Yet, workers in the preparing and 
spinning departments were affected disproportionately by the reor-
ganisation of work and the ensuing measures of rationalisation. This 
was, first of all, apparent in the problem of mass dismissals. Until the 
late 1920s, the majority of mills on the Hooghly had worked with a 
system of excess-employment. The number of workers deployed for 
specific tasks, in other words, always exceeded the number of workers 
actually required to run the machines. This system had been intro-
duced in the nineteenth century, in order to compensate for temporary 
labour shortages (Sailer 2015: 35ff.).  
The degree of excess employment, however, was not distributed 
evenly throughout the mill. It was by far the highest in the preparing 
and spinning departments. Contemporary observers estimated that 
between 10-25 per cent of the workforce in these departments was 
employed in excess to the requirements of the process of production. 
This concentration of 'additional' workers was an outcome of the same 
managerial concerns which had shaped employment strategies in the 
early twentieth century. The abolition of the system, in other words, 
implied that the stability of production, which had favoured the 
employment of 'madrassi' workers in the past, had ceased to be a 
central concern of managers at a time of massive unemployment in 
the jute belt (ibid.: 142ff.).  
A second important reason for mass dismissals was measures of 
rationalisation, which implied the re-arrangement of the process of 
production, and the speeding up of machinery. The effects of rationali-
sation were most pronounced among workers whose jobs were consi-
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dered particularly unskilled. In other words, workers in the preparing 
and spinning departments were, yet again, affected disproportionately 
by these changes. Managers thus regularly reported the progress of 
measures of rationalisation in these departments.19 
The changing organisation of work in jute mills coincided with a 
second set of changes: the growing predominance of adult male 
employment and the declining employment of women in Indian indus-
tries. In the jute industry, this trend has been noted by Samita Sen, 
who has shown that women were increasingly pushed out of jute mills 
in this period (Sen 1999: 241-2). In the course of the reorganisation of 
work, women workers suffered considerable wage losses, even in rela-
tion to other sections of the workforce.20 Managers and managing 
agents, meanwhile, seized the chance to dismiss children while reorga-
nising work. Between the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the number 
of children employed in jute mills dropped from 20,000 to less than 
100.21 While the inspector of factories expressed contentment with this 
development, it seems likely that these children moved from the mill 
to the bazar, or to smaller industries not subject to the Indian Facto-
ries Act.22 The importance of a joint family income was, after all, inten-
sified even further in a situation of mass-dismissals and wage-cuts. 
After the Great Depression, the situation in the jute industry impro-
ved only marginally. The demand for jute goods remained unex-
pectedly low—at least from the perspective of an industry whose pro-
ductive capacity still exceeded the potential demand for its goods 
(Goswami 1991: 100-1; Stewart 1998: 239-40). The mills of the IJMA, 
consequently, entered into a new round of short-time agreements, 
keeping prices for jute goods comparatively high for the time being. 
This measure, however, only served to postpone an open competition 
between Bengal jute mills. The impression that this crisis could be 
overcome only if the productive capacity of the mills on the Hooghly 
was reduced—if, in other words, some jute mills in Bengal went bank-
rupt—was by now shared by many contemporaries. Disputes over 
short-time agreements between the IJMA and Indian mill owners con-
tributed to the escalation of conflicts in the 1930s. The result was that 
the second half of the decade was marked by a fierce competition 
between jute mills, which Paul Benthall of the Bird Company described 
as a "survival of the fittest."23 
The second half of the 1930s was marked by fresh measures of 
rationalisation, and increasing pressure on workers. While this meant 
on one level a continuity of the earlier policy of managers and mana-
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ging agents, it also involved an increased emphasis on measures which 
served to reduce long-run labour costs. The introduction of new machi-
nery thus became an important theme in the following years. The in-
troduction of high-speed spinning frames was a key tactic in mana-
gerial attempts to improve the process of production. High-speed spin-
ning frames were first installed in 1935. They considerably reduced 
labour costs by increasing productivity.24 Roving machines were 
another type of machines, which were connected to the spinning 
department, and came to be replaced by high-speed machines. By 
1937, mills all along the river had installed some of these machines.25 
The introduction of high-speed spinning frames, needless to say, led 
to the dismissal of spinners. Fewer workers were required to produce a 
given amount of yarn. Yet the introduction of high-speed spinning fra-
mes also ended up making an important problem visible: the suc-
cessive re-organisations of work in the spinning-department led to a 
process of skilling of spinners. Under the older system of excess-
employment, workers could train themselves 'on the job', by working 
as 'additional' workers and sharing their work with experienced wor-
kers (Sailer 2015: 160). In the second half of the 1930s, managers 
and managing agents thus began to complain about short supplies of 
skilled workers in the spinning and weaving departments. In the late 
1930s, the mills of the IJMA introduced a rudimentary system of 
apprenticeships in order to tackle the problem. This attempt, however, 
was not particularly successful, as the new apprentices received no 
wages, and were only given the option of graduating to 'badli' worker if 
they finished their apprenticeship.26 
The reorganisation of work, and the successive rounds of rationali-
sation in the jute industry, then, affected 'madrassi' workers in diverse 
ways. While they were affected disproportionately as families, they 
simultaneously enjoyed increased bargaining power as individuals due 
to the position of male adult workers at the point of production. The 
dismissal of children, meanwhile, points us in another direction: the 
importance of jobs in the informal economy, such as in local bazars. 
We have already seen, that (some) 'madrassi' children learned rudi-
mentary Bengali in order to work in the mill towns. It is in this context 
not surprising, that several managers noticed new teachers in 
'madrassi' lines, when older children, too, were dismissed.27 Presuma-
bly the dismissal of children increased the networks that stretched 
from 'coolie lines' to urban neighbourhoods. The re-organisation of 
work in the jute industry, in other words, led to a peculiar coexistence 
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of strictly contrary impacts on 'madrassi' workers in the urban mill 
area and at the point of production.    
3 
In Titagarh, 'madrassi' workers came to play a dominant role in labour 
conflicts in the late 1920s. The abolition of the system of excess-
employment in a growing number of jute mills seemed to lead to 
anxieties, among workers in Titagarh, that the system could be abo-
lished in their mill as well. Communist trade unionists from the Bengal 
Jute Workers Union (later renamed the Bengal Chatkal Mazdoor Union 
or BCMU) seemed to be aware of these anxieties. When the IJMA 
announced that their mills would increase the weekly hours of work 
from 54 to 60, Bankim Mukherjee and other members of the trade 
union distributed leaflets which suggested that the mills of the IJMA 
wanted to abolish the system of excess-employment at the same 
time.28 
A few months later, when weavers in Jagatdal had gone on strike 
against a cut in wages and an increase in hours of work, the BCMU 
addressed workers in Titagarh in order to induce them to join the 
general strike. The workers, however, were opposed to any strike 
action, and interrupted the members of the BCMU repeatedly, empha-
sising the sufferings that would be endured. Bankim Mukherjee asked: 
"Will not the authorities take advantage of the knowledge that you are 
not at all in a position to strike? To this Bankim got no direct answer, 
only there was a murmur among the audience and he tried to press 
home his point in the manner mentioned above."29 Ten days later, wor-
kers in Titagarh joined the general strike, led by 'madrassi' workers.30 
In the following years, 'madrassi' workers played a leading role in 
seven out of eight strikes in Titagarh. Their grievances were remark-
ably consistent: they protested against dismissals, demanded the re-
introduction of the old system of excess-employment, or, from the 
second half of the 1930s, the reversal of cuts made during the Great 
Depression.31 While the BCMU was not involved in most of these stri-
kes, the workers' contacts with trade unionists, too, seem to have 
been fairly consistent. In April 1936, for instance, two rank-and-file 
members of the BCMU visited a group of 'madrassi' workers in Tita-
garh, who had become involved in the trade union during the general 
strike of 1929. The objective of this meeting was to discuss the possi-
bility of a new general strike in the jute industry.32 The outcome of this 
discussion is not known. 
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Another consistent feature of labour conflicts in Titagarh was that 
the patterns of protest exhibited strong networks among 'madrassi' 
workers which came to be deployed at these moments. This was, first 
of all, apparent with regard to networks between different mills, and 
even between different mill towns. In March 1930, for instance, a stri-
ke started in three jute mills in Titagarh. Two days later, the manager 
of Titaghur Jute Mill No. 2 reported that 
a crowd of about four hundred persons, mostly Spinners from 
other Mills, rushed into the Spinning Department shouting and 
setting of the frames. Some difficulty was experienced in clearing 
the department but this was successfully managed by the Euro-
pean Staff and when the crowd had been put out the Mill gates 
were closed and machinery restarted.33 
'Madrassis' in Titaghur No. 1 and No. 2 Mill, however, joined the strike 
the same day. After workers had left their workplace, they proceeded 
to Khardah, as the manager reported further. The Khardah Jute Mills 
joined the strike the next day, followed by a strike in mills in Jaga-
tdal.34 
The patterns of strikes in Titagarh display, secondly, specific hie-
rarchies among 'madrassi' workers. Most prominent among these were 
hierarchies between male and female workers. Strikes among 
'madrassi' workers usually started in the spinning department. Instead 
of leaving the site of production, however, workers regularly marched 
to the preparing departments, where the female members of their 
families worked, in order to bring them out.35 In contemporary reports, 
this practice was described as acts of violence against women wor-
kers.36 Historians too followed a similar line of argument (Basu 2004: 
212; Sen 1999: 224). Yet, it seems more likely that these practices 
were an articulation of family relations. Acts of 'intimidation' of women 
workers, then, were arguably not random acts of violence, but a 
precise expression of patriarchal familial relations between men and 
women. These relations were not restricted to the workplace, but were 
deployed at the site of production in particular ways at the moment of 
conflict. 'Madrassi' spinners could claim control over two departments 
of the jute mill thus increasing their bargaining power in labour con-
flicts. Gendered notions of male honour, meanwhile, may have increa-
sed the apparent necessity to exercise this control at moments of 
conflict. 
Another level of hierarchy was apparent in a series of conflicts in 
1937. After the general strike between February and April that year, 
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two successive strikes occurred in the Titaghur Jute Mills. After the ge-
neral strike ended, a new strike broke out in the Titaghur Mills on 22 
May. The main demand was an increase in the number of spinners em-
ployed per frame. The managers were willing to concede if the workers 
were willing to accept a reduction in wages. Displaying, yet again, the 
importance of networks among 'madrassi' workers, the spinners accep-
ted this offer and resumed work on 24 May.37 
Three days later, however, 'madrassi' shifters demanded "an extra 
shifter per squad." Managers rejected this request. The shifters res-
ponded by going on strike the same day. The following events on that 
day demonstrated a crucial tension between spinners and shifters. 
Managers reported that 
[m]eetings were held in the Bazar in the course of the evening 
and it was reported that a disagreement between the Spinners 
and the Shifters had taken place owing to the stoppage of work. 
News was received later on that evening that work would be resu-
med the following morning. Whistles were blown accordingly and 
a full start was made.38 
The general manager of the mills of the Duff Company reported further 
about the resumption of work: "Actually, they were in the department 
shortly after 5-30 a.m., and shifted all the Frames left over from the 
previous day, in redress for the 6 o’clock start."39 It seems quite clear 
that the spinners were responsible for the shifters’ unconditional 
resumption of work that night, and their early start the next morning. 
In this case, too, we arguably see family networks at work. The majo-
rity of shifters were 'young persons', and, thus, the sons of 'spinners' 
or other 'madrassi' workers. In either way, this incident demonstrated 
the considerable degree of control which 'madrassi' workers exercised 
at the site of production. 
The situation in Titagarh, however, was not exceptional among la-
bour conflicts in the jute belt at large, nor was the importance of spin-
ners during labour conflicts restricted to 'madrassi' workers. While 
weavers played a dominant role in labour conflicts in this period as 
well, spinners regularly assumed a leading role in the subsequent 
chain of events. Symptomatic of this tendency was the general strike 
of 1937. Strikes started after the dismissal of four 'up-country' wea-
vers. Initially, this only affected mills in Howrah, and workers deman-
ded the re-instatement of the dismissed workers. By March, however, 
unrest had spread to the southern parts of the jute belt where it was 
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led by 'local' workers. Describing the events at the Birla Jute Mill, a 
police report stated further that: 
About 500 strikers of Budge Budge side came in procession carry-
ing red flags and shouting communist slogans on 2.3.37. They 
prepared at the mills gate and threatened the workers and on 
4.3.37 a riot took place as the spinners of the mills came out in a 
body, joined the strikes and assaulted the European Engineer of 
Birla Mills and others.40 
Within a month, strike actions were reported from the northern parts 
of the jute belt as well. On 15 April the general manager of the Duff 
Company reported to Dundee: "[...] the Spinners at No. 1 Mill, parti-
cularly on the Sacking side, refused to start up their frames at 1-30 
p.m., and eventually the Manager was forced to close down for the 
day."41 
By the end of the month, more than 123,000 jute workers were on 
strike ("123,000 Jute Mill Workers Idle" 1937: 13). At this point the 
BCMU declared the end of the general strike after the members of the 
IJMA had agreed to consider the workers' demands favourably. By 8 
May, the majority of workers had resumed work and the conflict was 
restricted to mills in Howrah where it had begun. In contrast to the 
situation in February, however, local workers were the ones to con-
tinue the strike. This led to increasing tensions between different sec-
tions of the workforce, as 'up-country' workers wanted to resume 
work. By mid-May, local workers, too, resumed their work and the stri-
ke ended (Basu 2004: 244).  
Localised labour conflicts were practically a continuous feature in the 
Bengal jute industry in the aftermath of the general strike in 1937. The 
dynamics of these conflicts reflected the grievances of spinners which 
were also addressed by trade unionists; as well as relations among 
'madrassi' workers that demonstrated distinct networks and hie-
rarchies. Members of the BCMU, for instance, told spinners regularly 
that new machines would be introduced in their mills—and throughout 
the industry−soon, leading to the dismissal of large numbers of wor-
kers. Workers started creating 'workers committees' at the site of pro-
duction, while these committees were led by workers who had become 
members of the BCMU; the patterns of strikes bore close similarities to 
those which we have seen among 'madrassi' workers.42 This visibility 
of 'madrassi' workers, arguably, rested on their involvement in labour 
politics, on community networks across different mills, and on gender 
relations at the point of production. 
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4 
During the 1930s, 'madrassi' workers repeatedly exhibited their ability 
to enforce a complete closure of the mills. This, however, contributed 
to tensions within the workforce. The main line of conflict was, not sur-
prisingly, between spinners and weavers. Until the 1920s, weavers 
occupied the highest position within the internal hierarchy among wor-
kers. They earned the highest wages and their work was the most skil-
led. But the developments of the 1930s seemed to reverse this hierar-
chy to some degree, as spinners began to exercise their capacity to 
stop work at random moments of the day. The conflict between spin-
ners and weavers, however, was simultaneously a conflict between 
Hindu and Muslim workers. In the aftermath of the general strike of 
1937, this second set of identities came to dominate the conflict 
between the two sections of the workforce, and it shaped the chain of 
events in Titagarh in 1938 significantly. 
In the course of the general strike of 1929 conflicts within the work-
force seem to have played a relatively marginal role. The only recorded 
conflict broke out over the question of whether wages should be drawn 
during the strike or not. Spinners seem to have been inclined to accept 
wages, whereas weavers rejected this on the grounds of honour.43 It is 
not clear how the workers resolved this conflict, but at the same time 
it is apparent that the main question was how to act during a strike. 
During the Great Depression, however, communal tensions became 
apparent. While 'madrassi' spinners started and led strikes, 'up-coun-
try’ workers, often weavers, wanted to resume work instead. When 
'madrassi' workers, then, started two new strikes in quick succession, 
the tensions between the two sections of the workforce intensified con-
siderably. Both strikes, after all, revolved around demands which 
affected only workers in the spinning department, but forced the entire 
workforce to stop production. 'Up-country' weavers, in particular, see-
med unwilling to support a new strike on behalf of 'madrassi' workers 
alone.44 
At the same time, communal tensions were rising throughout the 
industrial hinterland of Bengal. The new labour minister of Bengal, 
Shaheed Suhrawardy, contributed to this by addressing workers in 
Urdu during the general strike. Whereas Muslim workers responded 
favourably to Suhrawardy, 'madrassis' complained bitterly about these 
speeches, as they did not understand Urdu.45 In the second half of 
1937, Suhrawardy set up a moderate trade union, the Bengal National 
Chamber of Labour. This union was an attempt to weaken the more 
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radical Bengal Jute Workers’ Union. To this end, the new union made 
"strident appeals to Muslim sentiments", as Subho Basu has pointed 
out (Basu 2004: 259). At the same time, the new union underlined its 
connections with the "state machinery", thus enabling Suhrawardy to 
"consolidate his position among Muslim workers" further (ibid.: 258-9).  
The Duff Company contributed to the escalation of the conflict. In 
October 1938, the company directors employed a labour officer in 
order to improve relations between workers and managers.46 The idea 
was not new as, for example, the Bird Company had recently employ-
yed a labour officer as well.47 Further, in order to improve their con-
nections with the newly elected government of Bengal, the directors of 
the Duff Company chose to employ Mr. Karim, a retired clerk, who sta-
ted that he was a friend of Suhrawardy.48 When the strike in Titagarh 
began, the newly employed labour officer was sent to Titagarh to 
improve the strike situation. During the strike Karim was in touch with 
workers and tried to persuade them to resume work.49 However, he 
seems to have barely spoken with Hindu workers addressing only Mus-
lim workers.50 
When a new strike started in November 1938, the lines between a 
labour dispute and a communal conflict became blurred. Only four 
days after the strike in the Titaghur Mills had started, the general 
manager of the mills of the Duff Company described the subsequent 
events as follows: 
You would observe from the special message sent yesterday that 
the situation in Titaghur Bazaar took a distinct turn for the worse 
on Wednesday night, and that matters were somewhat serious. I 
mentioned in Private Official of 16th instant that the Police Force 
then was really insufficient [...] and this, I am afraid, had been 
taken advantage of, as there were a number of clashes during the 
day and many more after night-fall, resulting in 3 deaths and 
many wounded.51 
He also added that the strike had started shortly after the Durga Puja 
festival, for which the workers had been granted one week’s leave. The 
Muslim workers, accordingly, felt "very bitter at again losing wages so 
soon after their enforced long holiday."52 Making matters worse, the 
strike also started just a few days before the end of Ramadan, which 
rendered the loss of wages even more problematic for the Muslim wor-
kers.53 
After the riots in November, strong police detachments and the 
Frontier Rifles were posted in Titagarh. In the following days the situa-
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tion stayed calm, until the end of the strike in early January 1939.54 
Despite the end of open violence , the merger of communal conflict 
and labour conflict remained visible. The Special Branch of Police noted 
the presence of Arya Samajists and Muslim Leaguers among the wor-
kers in Titagarh, while local labour activists increasingly identified 
themselves with these groups.55 Simultaneously, communist members 
of the BCMU became more and more involved, and discussed orga-
nising a general strike. Some members of the union started "intensive 
propaganda among the jute workers in Tittagarh and neighbouring 
areas", expressing the hope that "a general strike would help to re-
move communal differences by focussing attention on economic 
issues."56 The increasing presence of communist trade unionists was 
presumably also an attempt to diminish the importance of the Arya 
Samaj and the Muslim League in the area. A general strike, thus, was 
called for 5 December 1938. 
This step, however, was highly disputed within the BCMU. A consi-
derable section of the union members feared that an escalation of 
communal violence would result from intervention at this juncture. The 
question of how to understand the strike in Titagarh—as a labour con-
flict with communal tensions, or as a communal conflict among jute 
workers—therefore triggered very fierce discussions within the union.57 
Anticipations of communal violence, however, were presumably part of 
the reason why 'madrassi' workers barely received any active support 
from the BCMU, against their dismissal after the strikes ended.   
In December 1938 the communal riots and the resulting police pre-
sence ended up providing another important condition for the mass 
dismissal of 'madrassi' workers. When the strike started in November, 
the general manager of the Duff Company had not expressed any 
intention of dismissing all 'madrassi' workers. He had also rejected a 
plan to this effect by representatives of the Bird Company, as he 
feared that the mass dismissal of 'madrassis' could lead to riots and 
the destruction of mill machinery.58 The presence of the police forces 
and Frontier Rifles after the communal riots, however, reduced this 
risk considerably. By the middle of December, then, when the manager 
of Titaghur Mill No. 2 started working again, 'madrassi' workers were 
not allowed to enter the mill any more. By the end of the month, the 
Titaghur Mill No. 1, too, started to work again, while not allowing 
'madrassi' workers to enter the mill. When police forces gradually left 
the area in early January, the 'madrassi' workers in the Titagarh Jute 
Mills had already been dismissed and evicted. 
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The levels of production in the Titaghur Jute Mills declined in the 
aftermath of the strike. The main problem was that the mills’ 
managers could not find enough experienced workers to replace the 
'madrassi' workforce. This was most apparent with regard to the spin-
ning department.59 In 1940, when the levels of production had only 
improved marginally, managers began to hire 'madrassi' workers 
again.60 The re-employment of 'madrassi' workers implied a limit to 
managerial control. This was an outcome of the earlier strategies, 
which had favoured the employment of 'madrassi' workers in preparing 
and spinning departments. While this strategy had been abandoned in 
the late 1920s, problems of skill and work experience meant that ma-
nagers needed to rely on 'madrassi' workers at the point of production. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have tried to trace the history of 'madrassi' spinners in 
the Titaghur Jute Mills. While this group of workers was a minority in 
the jute mill workforce, it was the dominant group in labour protests in 
Titagarh in the 1930s. This development rested on two distinct fields 
within which these conflicts emerged. The first was characterised by 
the changing position of 'madrassi' workers in a complex system of 
managerial employment strategies, as well as by the changing position 
of spinners, women, and children at the site of production. The second 
field involves the ways in which 'madrassi' workers appropriated the 
spaces of the factory and of the neighbourhood. It was, thus, marked 
by family based relations at the workplace, as well as community 
based solidarities in the wider area of Titagarh. 
In the second half of the 1930s, these two fields came to be increa-
singly interwoven with trade union politics on the one hand, as well as 
communal politics on the other. While these interconnections can, in 
principle, be traced to the late 1920s, this feature acquired consi-
derable importance in 1937. This had significant implications on the 
dynamics of labour conflicts in Titagarh, and it was central in creating 
a situation in which the managers of the Titaghur Jute Mills could af-
ford to dismiss all their 'madrassi' workers. 
Social identities in the jute belt, therefore, overlapped with the 
dynamics of work processes, family arrangements, neighbourhood 
structures, and labour politics. The fact that 'madrassis' were employ-
ed as families in different departments, shaped their power at the 
workplace. The family connections also sharpened neighbourhood 
dynamics, especially when women and children were dismissed from 
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the mill and had to find work elsewhere. Trade union agitation addres-
sed the organisation of work in the mills—and since this was precisely 
the chief problem faced by 'madrassi' workers, it led to the solidifying 
of links which contributed to escalating labour protest in the late 
1930s. This segmentation was also a prime mover in communal con-
flict. The overlapping of class, community and other social identities 
certainly did play an important role in shaping the history of the jute 
workforce.  Yet, it needs to be stressed that it is by no means sufficient 
to analyse these registers principally through the lens of neighbour-
hood networks, as recent labour history has tended to do. Neither the 
effects of segmentation on the workforce, nor the dynamics of labour 
protest, can be understood with reference to an abstract and generi-
cally conceived workplace. If we are to understand the dynamics within 
working-class neighbourhoods, we also need to historicise the work-
place itself. 
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